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 Dynamic and Static Components of Political
 Support in Britain
 Bruce E. Cain, California Institute of Technology
 Many studies in British politics in particular and comparative politics more
 generally have shown a strong relation between personal attributes and voting be-
 havior. Such studies have tended to assume an excessively static picture of party
 support. "Issue-voting" models, on the other hand, have not adequately accounted
 for sources of electoral stability. This paper attempts to link structural and political
 factors in a single model of political preference, and to show the implications of
 this for the study of broader questions such as why political systems remain stable
 or change over time. Two routes by which the social structure affects political
 preferences are posited, estimated, and compared. The strength of the endogenous
 political component raises the question of the source of stability in the British
 political system. The proposed model thus estimates the importance of lagged judg-
 ments and socialization biases in maintaining a core of "partisan" support for the
 parties.
 Comparative electoral research has repeatedly demonstrated the
 strong association between socioeconomic attributes such as class, religion,
 region, language, etc. and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Al-
 ford, 1963; Rose, 1974). These correlations have provided useful profiles
 of typical party voters and a mode of comparison for patterns of support
 across several nations. Some attention has been paid to the behavioral ex-
 planations behind these correlations, but all too frequently the different
 ways in which the social structure influences electoral behavior have been
 lumped together and empirically ignored. More importantly, while most
 analyses acknowledge the role of party strategy and voter response-the
 "endogenous" component of party support-few have attempted to link
 structural and political factors within the same framework. The result has
 been that socioeconomic structural explanations of electoral behavior have
 been excessively static. At the same time, rational, neo-Downsian models
 which emphasize "issue-voting" have ignored the group processes which
 contribute to stable electoral cleavages. Most drastically, "normal vote"
 analysis has actually separated party support into two independent com-
 ponents: stable long term and variable short term forces (Converse, 1966;
 Hinckley, 1970; Kabaker, 1969).
 This paper will consider a model of the British electorate which tries
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 to account for both exogenous structural and endogenous political factors.
 The specification of the proposed model will be discussed in some detail
 and tested with British survey data. These estimates will then be used to
 examine (1 ) the relative impact of the exogenous structural and endoge-
 nous political components on partisan preference, and (2) the problem of
 whether a model which incorporates a significant endogenous component
 can successfully account for electoral stability.
 The Proposed Model
 The structure of the proposed theory is as follows:
 AXO f(UX, PO) (1)
 Ax t f (Ux, P,, Ax_ (2)
 Ux =f(P t,Z) (3)
 where
 A-x -the assessment of party x at the time of entry into the
 electorate
 Ax t the assessment of party x at time t
 Ax_l the assessment of party x at time t -1
 PO background and family socialization pressures at the time
 of entry into the electorate
 Pt background and family socialization pressures at time t
 UOX the utility derived from party x at time of entry into the
 electorate
 Ut_l I = the utility derived from party x at time t -1
 U tx =-the utility derived from party x at time t
 Z other exogenous attitude determinations
 At the moment of entry into the electorate, this model suggests that an
 individual's assessment of party x will be a function of the perceived utility
 of that party's policies and of background factors. The variable Po repre-
 sents socialization components such as family and social peer group accep-
 tance which create in an individual a predisposition towards one party apart
 from considerations of issue proximity. In England, the variable Po might
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 be represented by class and family membership, but in other countries,
 membership in a religious, ethnic, agrarian, or linguistic group may create
 the comparable social pressure. These conformity effects can be explained
 within either a rational-utilitarian or sociological framework. The Down-
 sian might want to call them nonissue utilities since there can be high costs
 to holding preferences which are different from those of one's parents,
 peers, or coworkers and benefits to be derived in terms of esteem and re-
 spect from conformity. From a social-psychological standpoint, these pres-
 sures can simply be explained as role expectations. However described,
 the first way in which the social structure influences political preferences in
 this model is through the creation of group loyalties and pressures inde-
 pendent of an individual's attitudes.
 It is also possible that background factors are important in the trans-
 mission of information and the formulation of political attitudes. Clearly,
 a variety of factors affect and change individual attitudes, but one impor-
 tant source is that an individual's position in the socioeconomic structure
 causes that person to assess the impact of policies on his utility from a dif-
 ferent perspective than a person in another socioeconomic situation. To
 take an obvious example, the interests of a worker in a steel mill are af-
 fected differently by a deflationary, high unemployment policy than are
 those of a pensioner on a fixed income. At the same time, the formulation
 of opinions is more complex than a simple identification with material in-
 terest. Most troublesome is the possibility that parties through the emphasis
 of their platforms and propaganda influence individual attitudes. While
 there is only suggestive evidence of this in the British case (Blumler and
 McQuail, 1968), more systematic evidence from American data shows
 that party identification has a discernible causal impact on issue evalua-
 tions, even though less than the impact of either exogenous factors on
 issues or of issue evaluations on party identification itself (Jackson, 1975,
 pp. 161-185). It is also likely that television and the press partly deter-
 mine as well as reinforce opinion, particularly in the cases of highly media-
 exposed, uncertain or "weakly motivated" individuals (Blumler and Mc-
 Quail, 1968), and on issues about which the public has little direct knowl-
 edge (Lippman, 1922; Ure, 1968). The implication is that individual
 preferences are not fixed, but vary by some function involving self-interest,
 exposure to the media, personality, and a stochastic error component.
 While social structure is related to attitude formation, the impact of
 changes in the social structure on party preferences is by no means simple.
 This is so because party preferences will vary with the perceived proximity
 of individual attitudes to party positions and will not depend on individual
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 issue attitudes alone. If Q is defined as a vector of individual i's preferred
 positions on a set of issues qil, . . . , xi., and X is a vector of perceived
 party positions xi,,. . . , xi., then the value of Ut will be greatest when Q
 - X. The common mode of expressing the utility of party preference in
 cases where Q 7& X is the loss formulation. The logic behind the loss for-
 mulation has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere and need not be repli-
 cated in great detail here (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Davis et al., 1970).
 Briefly, this concept suggests that voters are typically confronted with alter-
 natives which are less than ideal. This can be expressed as:
 Ut lILt
 Ut is the utility to individual i from party x's policies at time t
 I is the normalized value of Ut when Q = X
 Lx is the loss to individual i at time t from party x
 The problem which confronts the voter is choosing that alternative with
 the minimal loss. In early spatial models, the calculation of loss was usu-
 ally given a quadratic form:
 Lx (Q -X)'`A(Q -X)
 where
 A is a matrix of weights assigned to each issue by the voter
 Q is the vector of preferred positions
 X is the vector of party positions
 An individual with no predispositions or biases will prefer party x to party
 yif Ut > Uy implying that Lx > Lt.
 A change in an individual's socioeconomic position may alter that
 person's views on a set of issues X or on the importance he/she assigns to
 those issues, but any corresponding increase or decrease in perceived util-
 -ity loss will depend on Q as well. This demonstrates an important distinc-
 tion: the causal path of the social structure. on party preferences through
 role expectations is direct, while the impact of social structure on party
 preferences through attitudes is conditional on the behavior of other actors
 in the political system. It is possible for an individual to change his/her
 issue position, but experience no change in partisan evaluation simply be-
 cause the position of the party shifted in the same direction, or for an in-
 dividual to keep the same issue position but still experience an increase in
 loss, because the party position shifted in the opposite direction. The wider
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 implication is that by incorporating an endogenous political component, a
 model of electoral choice can account for changes in the distribution of
 party support in the absence of cataclysmic social change, or, for that mat-
 ter, can account for stability in the distribution of party support despite
 measurable social mobility, economic growth, or demographic shifts. The
 former is particularly important for the study of British politics since the
 decline of major party support and the rise in the number of Liberals and
 abstainers in the period from 1964 to 1974 cannot be attributed to any
 significant change in the social structure (Crewe, 1974). In models that
 rely exclusively on static socialization components, the forces of habit and
 conformity are so great that the political system automatically gravitates to
 a pattern of stable support. Only major social or international upheaval
 can jar the system from its equilibrium, and then once again gravitation
 towards stability begins. In spatial models, support is affected and main-
 tained by party policies and behavior in office; it is not automatic, and
 can be augmented or dissipated by political strategy. Since political change
 in the proposed model can come endogenously from within the political
 system as well as exogenously from the social structure or international
 system, no single cataclysmic trauma need precede a realignment in the
 electoral system. This will hopefully provide a more flexible explanation
 of political change, capable of accounting for anomalies in more static
 theories such as the Butler-Stokes model.
 Political Stability and Endogenous Components
 If the pitfall of socialization models has been an excessive emphasis
 on the structural determinants of individual preferences, early rational
 theories were less able to account for stable group and personal party
 loyalties. Political scientists have discovered that party preferences tend to
 be more stable than attitudes and that some individuals are more immune
 than others to changes in their voting behavior (Campbell et al., 1964;
 Butler and Stokes, 1974). One interpretation of the party identification
 literature is that voters enter an electoral period with biases accumulated
 from the past, and that these biases contribute to the overall stability of
 the electoral system. In the framework of a rational paradigm, this amounts
 to saying that individuals utilize information and judgments formed at
 earlier periods as well as current knowledge when making choices. The
 proposed model must, therefore, incorporate the notion of partisanship
 and explain the relationship between adjusting and lagged components of
 voting decisions.
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 A simple way to represent the effect of past issue evaluations is to
 assume a geometrically declining impact over time. The assessment of
 party x at time t can be expressed as a weighted function of issue evalua-
 tions from the voter's childhood to the present:
 A = Bo + B1Ul4 + B9U 1t_ + + et
 By assuming that the weight of an issue evaluation declines geometrically
 over time starting at the first lag, we can express the coefficients B2 ... Bn
 as products of B1 and some lag operator X:
 B2 = kB1, B3 =X2Bi, B4 =X3B,, etc. 0 < X < 1
 The original expression can be rewritten as:
 AT =Bo+BiUT +XBiUtX_ +X2BiU 2 +.. .+et
 Similarly, the assessment at t - 1 can be expressed as:
 =1 Bo + B+U X + XB1U_ + ? 2B1Uxt-3 + ... + et-l
 Discounting the previous assessment involves weighting the expression for
 At-, by the lag operator:
 XAx1 =Bo+ ?XB,Ux_ + X2B,U 2 *+ke
 The difference between the two expressions will be:
 Ax = A( - BO(X ? U +XBAUx + (et ket-X )
 At BO(l X )+ B,Ux + XAx , + (et - et-l)
 This model is known as a Koyck lag (Theil, 1971, p. 260). The final equa-
 tion implies that an individual's assessment at t of party x will be a func-
 tion of some constan-t term, issue evaluations at t and past issue evalua-
 tions discounted by some weight X. The same sort of reasoning can be ex-
 tended to include the direct background effects posited earlier. If the ef-
 fect of class, peer group, or family pressures can be said to decline geo-
 metrically over time, the new expression will be:
 Ax= Bo(1 - X) +B BUx+ B ?XAtx + (et -Xet-i)
 The one clear advantage of this model is that it permits the estimation of
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 the effect of past evaluations where the direct insertion of lagged issue
 variables into the equation would be difficult due to the noncomparability
 of issue questions over time, multicollinearity, and the like.
 Theories of socialization also demonstrate that party evaluations begin
 at some point in childhood rather than starting from a point of indifference
 and impartiality with each election, but imply falsely that a political prefer-
 ence at any point in time is simply the earlier judgnent plus a random
 error component (Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 33-46):
 Ax = Ax + e
 The assumption in theories of socialization that Ax = Ax + e would
 hold true if UO did not change (since it is quite plausible to assume that
 P0 = Pt), or at least fluctuated randomly, such that E(Ux) = Ux. If, on
 the other hand, E(Uxt) #& Ux then the assumption will not hold. It is of
 course possible that for some individuals fluctuations of issue distance are
 random and the cumulative effect of these changes is zero. However, if we
 believe that changes in Ux are responses to the relative distance from party
 policies, and that party strategy itself is not purely random, then we can
 expect to find nonrandom changes in individual party preferences: that is
 to say, the continuity and trend of party policies and economic conditions
 ought to be reflected in party evaluations.
 The notion of lagged assessment has important implications for the
 theory of the rational voter. A voter is said to be rational when he/she
 responds to government policies-subject to the constraints of information
 -with an appropriate recalculation of preference. An individual at time t
 with a high previous assessment of party x and a low previous assessment
 of party y will not change the order of his previous assessment unless there
 has been a sufficient shift in the differential loss in the period t - 1 to t.
 It is possible therefore for a rational voter to continue preferring party x
 even though the loss in the last electoral period from party y was slightly
 less than the loss from party x. In this sense, the lagged assessment vari-
 able resembles the concept of partisan self-image in the analysis of Butler
 and Stokes and that of party identification in the American voting litera-
 ture. If Ax_ were to reach a sufficiently high level, the marginal impact of
 recent utility adjustments would be quite small. A high assessment of party
 x as the result of reinforcing past utility calculations and nonspatial pre-
 dispositions could then be defined as a high level of partisanship. The
 voter's probability of voting for party x would be very high: the pattern of
 voting over time would be stable and small changes in evaluations would
 not be reflected in voting behavior.
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 To sum up, there are three sources of stability in the proposed
 model: (1) The solidity of the underlying social structure will contribute
 to stable individual attitudes over time. This point should be viewed with
 some caution, however, since any model of attitudes must be more com-
 plex than a simple identification of socioeconomic self-interest and because
 the proximity of individual attitudes to the parties in the electoral system
 will depend on the behavior and statements of the parties in and out of
 office. (2) Vote maximizing party behavior is, therefore, the second source
 of stability in the proposed model in the sense that parties will shift their
 positions in response to change in the underlying distribution of opinions.
 (3) Finally, the accumulation of background biases as well as information
 and opinions acquired over the years serves as a buffer against the insecu-
 rity of instantaneous changes in voter affiliations. The fact that parties can
 draw on the accumulated credit of their partisans gives them a predictable
 base of support to build on.
 The Specification of the Model
 It is possible to test the proposed model with panel data collected in
 Britain between 1970 and 1974.1 As developed earlier, the specification of
 the model will be:
 Ax7 Bo+BIC+B2F+B ,Ux7 +B4A70+e74
 where
 Ax4 is the assessment of the Conservative and Labour parties in
 1974 as measured by a feeling thermometer score
 C is the respondent's class as measured by an occupation scale
 F is the father's partisan preference weighted by the intensity of
 his political preference
 Ux74 is the respondent's issue evaluation score in 1974
 Ax0 is the assessment of the Conservative and Labour parties in
 1970 again measured by a feeling thermometer
 This is the same equation as before except that class and family are specifi-
 cally posited as the background factors. To reiterate an earlier interpretation
 1 The data for this study is a panel initiated by Butler and Stokes in 1970 and
 continued by the University of Essex under the direction of Ivor Crewe and Bo
 Sarlvik in 1974. These scholars are, of course, not responsible for the views and
 analysis presented in this article.
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 of this equation, a person's assessment in 1974 wil be a function of issue
 evaluations in 1974, class and family role expectations in 1974, and a dis-
 counted 1970 assessment representing past issue evaluations and back-
 ground factors. In addition to their direct effects, the model also suggests
 that class and family will have an indirect effect on party assessment
 through a person's issue calculations:
 U f(F,C,Z)
 This will be handled by treating U74 as an endogenous variable and creat-
 ing an instrument for it from the variables F, C and other socioeconomic
 data Z.2
 The variables in the estimated equations are:
 (1) Ax4, Ax: The proxies for the party assessment variables are the
 respondent's feeling thermometers of the Conservative
 and Labour parties. These variables take on values be-
 tween 0 and 10.
 (2) C: The class measure is the respondent's occupation as rep-
 resented by an interval scaling (1, .5, 0, -.5, -1) of the
 standard A, B, Ci, C2, D, E classification.3
 (3) F: The family variable is the father's partisan affiliation
 weighted by a dummy measuring the importance of poli-
 tics to the father. The reasoning behind the weighting is
 that family pressures will not only vary with the direction
 but the intensity of parental partisanship as well.
 2The instruments for these equations are as follows: dummies for living in
 Scotland, Wales, the North, the South, the Midlands; dummies for the age cohort
 groups 65 and over, 51-65, 44-51, 18-31; dummies for home ownership, trade union
 membership, being self-employed, being unemployed, immigrants living in the neigh-
 borhood, unemployment in the surrounding area, level of education, and newspaper
 read; interval class variable; income; father's partisanship. The procedure employed
 computes the instruments in one step from the cross-products matrix so that any
 estimation of the first stage must be undertaken separately. This was done, and the
 R squares of these equations relating individual issue attitudes to sociodemographic
 variables range from a low of .11 in the taxation equation to a high of .42 for
 immigration. The level of correlation between the instruments and the endogenous
 variables will affect the efficiency but not the consistency of the estimates.
 3 The meaning of these categories is as follows: A-higher managerial or pro-
 fessional; B-lower managerial or administrative; C1-skilled and lower nonmanual;
 C2-skilled manual; D-unskilled manual; E-residual category, on pension or
 state benefit.
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 (4) ULJ: The utility of a party's policies will depend on the com-
 parative distance of party positions from the voter's ideal
 points. This can be represented as
 U- =y - L4-. 74 = 74 L7-l
 The utility of party x's policies will be greater for voter i
 when
 Ly > Lx. L74 > 74:
 i.e. when the loss or distance of party y's policies exceeds
 the loss or distance from party x's. Loss in turn is defined
 as the squared difference between the respondent's own
 position and the perceived party position weighted by a
 salience dummy.4 The sum of differences across a set of
 issues yields a composite loss score. The quadratic form
 of the loss variables is a common assumption in spatial
 theory and is used here to remain as faithful as possible
 to rational voter theory.5
 4 The issue positions of the respondents and the parties are first coded as interval
 variables ( ,.5,O,-.5,-1). There are important reasons to worry about interval
 codings (Grether, 1976), but I would argue here that (1) the wording of the issue
 responses convey the impression of equal distance between issue positions and (2)
 early experiments with dummy codings seem to indicate that the interval codings
 actually served to increase the t-statistics and the R-squares.
 5 The variables included in the summary measure are the Common Market,
 nationalization, and immigration: the final score is then averaged by the number of
 issues (3). The prices and strikes variables followed a slightly modified form. Downs
 argued that where an issue involved the relative competence of two opposing parties
 rather than some clearly defined ideological difference, the voter had to calculate his
 current party differential on the basis of his comparative assessment of how the
 government handled the particular problem in question and his expectation of how
 the opposition party would have handled the problem had it been in office (Downs,
 1957, pp. 36-S50). Economic questions are often thought to fall into this valence
 category (Butler and Stokes, 1974, pp. 238-242). It seemed useful, therefore, to
 construct the prices and strikes variables in a manner that would take into account
 the respondent's differential assessments and expectations. The 1974 questionnaire
 asked the respondents to rate how well the Conservative Government handled prices
 and strikes in its four years in office, and how well they thought the Labour Party
 would have handled the problem had it been in office during this period. These
 responses were then combined to give the judged utility difference:
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 In the estimation of the model, class and family were treated as ex-
 ogenous while the issue evaluation and lagged assessment variables are'
 treated as endogenous. The justification for creating an instrument for U-4
 follows from the discussion earlier about the indirect effects of background
 factors and also from the obvious possibility that measured proximity could
 be primarily the result of the respondent making preferred party position
 and revealed personal positions on the issues cognitively consistent, i.e. a
 simultaneous equation bias. The lagged feeling thermometer is also treat-
 ed as an endogenous variable since there is good reason to expect correla-
 tion between the error term of the implicit equation for the lagged assess-
 ment and unspecified explanatory factors which fall into the error term of
 the final question. As it is shown in standard econometric texts, creating
 an instrument for the lagged endogenous variable from exogenous vari-
 ables which are correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated
 with the error term of the equation will produce consistent estimates
 (Theil, 1971; Jackson and Hanushek, 1977).
 The results of the estimations are shown in Table 1. In the Conserva-
 tive equation, the family, lagged assessment, and issue evaluation variables
 are statistically significant with the correct signs. Only the class variable is
 insignificant, which is plausible given that the Conservative party has con-
 sciously cultivated a more ecumenical appeal than the Labour party and
 has, on average, been able to capture more than one-third of the working
 Strikes = a1 (pCOn - pLab)
 Prices = air (Pco -p Lab)
 where
 PCon Pron are the respondent's assessments of how well the Conservatives
 handled prices (r) and strikes (s)
 pLab pLab are the respondent's assessments of how well the Labour Party
 would have handled prices (r) and strikes (s)
 ais, air are the salience weights.
 These two basic forms of information about the voter's attitudes (i.e. valence and
 position summary measures) are estimated separately and the combined in a manner
 such that we expect a positive coefficient for the issue evaluation measure in the
 Conservative equation and a negative coefficient for that in the Labour equation, but
 in both cases the implication is that as losses decrease on the three position issues
 and the differential increases on the valence (i.e. prices and strikes) issues, the party
 assessment will rise.
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.150 on Fri, 27 Oct 2017 17:47:02 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 86o Bruce E. Cain
 TABLE 1
 A Test of the Model in Britain: 1970-74
 A74Con A74Lab
 A70Con .49*
 (.10)
 A70Lab .25*
 (.10)
 u74 2.00* 3.98*
 (.71) (.82)
 C .09 .41 *
 (.11) (.12)
 F .31* .36*
 (.11) (.13)
 Constant 2.75 4.46
 R2 .48 .43
 SE 1.88 2.05
 * Significant at .05
 class vote. In the Labour equation all the parameters are significant includ-
 ing class. It is interesting to note that the coefficient on the lagged Con-
 servative component is considerably larger than in the Labour case. There
 are several plausible explanations for this, including the fact that Conser-
 vative voters tend to be older than their Labour counterparts, and the pos-
 sibility that voters weigh the promises of opposition parties more heavily.
 No attempt was made to pursue these points further, but they may deserve
 future consideration.
 The Relative Impact of Background and Issue Variables
 It was argued earlier that one must distinguish structural exogenous
 and political endogenous change. The former means that changes in group
 membership will alter group loyalties, as in the case of an individual who
 moves from a blue collar to a white collar job. The direct effect of such
 social mobility as estimated in the equation is .31 in the Conservative case
 and .36 in the Labour case. Of course, the shift in occupation might also
 affect attitudes on certain issues and, assuming no corresponding change in
 party position, this might change the comparative issue evaluation. Class,
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 for example, was found to be significantly related to all issues except im-
 migration in 1974.6 Still, it is important to bear in mind that the indirect
 effect of background through issues is less deterministic than the direct ef-
 fect. A significant amount of social mobility across the population might
 soften traditional attitudes toward issues like nationalization or social ser-
 vices, but a careful monitoring of the polls might cause the parties to adapt
 their positions accordingly. Conversely, an individual who experiences no
 social mobility may perceive an increase in loss if the party changes its
 position in response to other voters, party activists, and the like. In short,
 the direct effects of structural change will be more obvious and predictable
 than the indirect effects through issue attitudes.
 This is important because the second observation to be drawn from
 these estimations is that the British electorate is extremely issue responsive:
 that is, small variations in issue proximity can produce important differ-
 ences in party evaluations. The maximum effect of only one issue deemed
 salient by the respondent as coded and using the estimated coefficients
 would be 2.26 on the scale of 0 to 10 measuring the voter's Conservative
 feeling thermometer rating. This would be the equivalent, for example, of
 a voter who favored further denationalization of British industries, who
 perceived that the Conservatives stood for further denationalization and
 that the Labour party stood for further nationalization, and who felt that
 the issue was very important. A less extreme disagreement would be a
 voter who favored nationalization of fewer industries, who perceived that
 the Conservatives held the same position but that the Labour party stood
 for no denationalizations and no new nationalizations, and who felt that
 the issue was very important. The estimated increment to the Conserva-
 tive feeling thermometer would in this instance be .56.
 The implication of issue responsiveness is very important for models
 of the British electorate because it indicates that a significant variability in
 party evaluations-and hence a significant variability in voting behavior-
 can result from changes in issue proximity. Since socioeconomic change is
 not a necessary condition for shifts in issue evaluations, it is possible to ac-
 count for realignments in individual or aggregate preferences in the ab-
 sence of social mobility or major socioeconomic disruptions: changes in
 public opinion or in perceived party policies for whatever reasons can
 cause disruptions in the prevailing patterns of partisan support. These pat-
 6 The coefficients relating class to various issues are as follows: .16 (.03) Prices;
 .05 (.01) Taxation; .23 (.01) EEC; .23 (.04) Strikes; .03 (.01) Nationalization;
 and .01 (.01) Immigration.
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 terns of partisan support are the result of a dynamic interaction between
 the parties and public opinion: the study of realignments and dealignments
 ought to focus on causes which emerge from this policy nexus.
 The Stability of Modeled Preferences
 Can a model which depends so heavily on endogenous political fac-
 tors successfully explain electoral stability? In addition to the stabilizing
 effects of party behavior and the social structure, it has been argued that
 voters enter an electoral period with predispositions as the result of back-
 ground factors and accumulated judgments. In this sense, voters are in
 varying degrees "partisan" and their choices at time t are made with dif-
 ferent amounts of bias. As the biases build, voters will be less responsive
 to current party strategy and policies and will resemble what political
 scientists call party identifiers.
 This point can be easily illustrated by a simulation using the estimated
 coefficients again. Table 2 shows the predicted scores of a middle class in-
 dividual with a Tory background given the 1970 assessment scores dis-
 played in the far left-hand column. Thus, if an individual assessed the
 Conservatives at 9 and the Labour party at 1 on the feeling thermometer
 in 1970, the predicted Conservative score holding issue evaluations con-
 TABLE 2
 A Simulation of Lagged Partisanship for a Middle
 Class Individual from a Tory Background
 A74con A74Lab
 A70 10 8.05 6.96
 9 7.56 6.71
 8 7.07 6.46
 7 6.58 6.21
 6 6.09 5.96
 5 5.60 5.71
 4 5.11 5.46
 3 4.62 5.21
 2 4.13 4.96
 1 3.64 4.71
 0 3.15 4.46
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 TABLE 3
 Correspondence Between Feeling Thermometer and Vote, 1970
 Feeling Percentage Percentage
 Thermometer Voting Voting
 Level Labour Conservative
 10 84.1 79.7
 9 72.5 75.3
 8 53.8 74.1
 7 65.1 54.4
 6 27.2 29.4
 5 8.5 4.4
 4 1.5 2.1
 3 1.0 0
 2 1.4
 1 0 3.7
 stant would be 7.56 and the Labour score would be 4.71. Remembering
 that the maximum disagreement for a salient issue yields a change of 2.26
 in the Conservative evaluation, a reversal of Conservative and Labour
 preferences in this case would require substantial disagreements with the
 Conservatives on several salient issues. Since we must presume that this
 individual was previously quite close to the Conservatives-a score of nine
 implies considerable proximity to the Conservatives in 1970-it is fair to
 conclude that a shift in the order of preference for this individual would
 require an almost inconceivable change in attitude orientation. Small dis-
 utilities from or indifference to the most recent Conservative policies would
 not significantly affect the preferences or behavior of this person. Conse-
 quently, this voter will exhibit the stable preferences and behavior of the
 so-called party identifier.
 The predisposition component can also be found for less extreme cases
 (shown in Table 2). The model predicts quite plausibly that individuals
 with low or indifferent previous assessments will change the order of their
 preferences in response to small changes in opinion. Such individuals re-
 semble those who have traditionally been called "independents" in Ameri-
 can voting studies and "non-identifiers" by Butler and Stokes. Their
 preferences will in general be less stable, and they will have a higher pro-
 pensity to switch their vote or abstain.
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 The estimations show that as the margin of previous assessment in-
 creases, a greater amount of contradictory information in the most recent
 period will be needed to shift the order of an individual's preference. The
 limitations on change-particularly at the highest levels of partisanship-
 seem even more significant when it is recalled that (1) individuals are not
 likely to feel strongly or be informed about all issues, (2) that attitudes
 at any time t are unlikely to be different on every single issue from what
 they were at time t - 1, and that, therefore, (3) any shift in attitudes suffi-
 cient to alter a high previous differential would involve an almost incon-
 ceivable reversal of attitudes. On the other hand, it is not difficult to see
 why there might be considerable volatility in the preferences of individuals
 in the middle ranges. Clearly, individuals are shown to have different de-
 grees of vulnerability to change.
 This analysis resists the temptation of classifying individuals into
 discrete categories although it makes the distinction between levels of par-
 tisanship. Partisanship is likened to a predetermined bias having the form
 of a continuous probability distribution with different likelihoods of be-
 havior at various points along the continuum rather than as identifiably
 distinct qualitative states.
 Consider Table 3, which shows the frequency with which individuals
 who had the feeling thermometer scores in the left-hand column voted for
 the Conservative and Labour parties in 1970. The fact that individuals
 who assessed a party at 10 do not vote for that party 100 percent of the
 time reflects the calculus by which individuals translate their preferences
 into behavior; such a calculus will involve the relative assessment of various
 alternatives and the individual's expectations of affecting the outcome.
 Still, the point is that the behavior of individuals with strong predisposi-
 tions will be less affected by contradictory new information than will those
 at middle levels of partisanship. It can be readily seen that the behavior
 of a voter at the partisan level of 6 or 7 will be more likely to change in
 response to policy disagreements than will the behavior of those at the
 upper or lower end of the scale. Thus, not only do partisan biases make it
 less likely that individuals will have substantial disagreements with their
 normal partisan preferences, but the impact of such disagreements on their
 behavior will vary inversely with the strength of their biases (positive or
 negative).
 Conclusion
 Clearly, it is possible to link socioeconomic and political components
 successfully in a single model of voter choice. It has been proven that the
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 endogenous evaluation component has a significant impact on partisan
 evaluations in Great Britain. This raises the possibility that party systems
 can change as the result of factors within the political system: in particular,
 as the result of responses to party strategy and performance. The impli-
 cation is that macropolitical models need not depend so heavily on the-
 ories of social determinism. At the same time, the insights about group
 pressures and individual biases which political scientists have borrowed
 from psychology and sociology need not be discarded entirely. Rather, it
 is possible to incorporate themn into the general model and use them to
 help account for stability within the political system.
 Manuscript submitted 5 May 1977
 Final manuscript received 27 October 1977
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